Note: Transcripts may contain errors. If you wish to re-use all, or part of, a transcript, please contact CBC for permission. Please check the corresponding audio before quoting in print. Copyright © CBC 2025

Front Burner Transcript for February 20, 2025

Host: Jayme Poisson

[Music: Theme]

JAYME POISSON: Hi, I'm Jayme Poisson.

[Music: Theme]

JP: So the second Trump administration has been in power for just over a month now, if you can believe it. They've been on quite a foreign policy tear. Trade wars, threats of annexation, bullish war negotiations. We've covered all of it. And one question that we want to try to understand on this show is what is all of this for for the Trump administration? To what end? I don't want to suggest that this is the only thing animating them, but one explanation here has to do with something Trump in the last two weeks has been really explicit about with Ukraine.

SOUNDCLIP

DONALD TRUMP: So we're looking to do a deal with Ukraine where they're going to secure what we're giving them with their rare earth and other things.

JP: That 'rare earth' that he's referring to is Ukraine's rich and mostly untapped wealth of critical minerals. Minerals that are used for all sorts of tech, from cell phones to EV batteries, and are in increasing demand as the world moves towards developing more renewable energy. It's not just Ukraine. Canada and Greenland also have that in common -- rich mineral reserves. Jacob Lorinc is a mining reporter at Bloomberg, and he's here with us today to talk about how the U.S.'s desire to challenge China's dominance in the global critical mineral race could be key to understanding, at least in part, why Trump's gone after us and a handful of other countries since taking office.

JP: Jacob, hey, thank you so much for coming onto Front Burner.

JACOB LORINC: Hey, thanks for having me.

JP: It's really a pleasure. So the demand for critical minerals has been growing for years now, and just why does it seem like we're hearing so much more about the race for them now?

JACOB LORINC: Yeah, so, I mean, to take a huge step back, I think to understand, you know, the race for critical minerals now, we need only look back about a century ago to the end of the second industrial revolution, you know, when everyone was looking for oil and gas that could underpin heating, mass manufacturing, cars. And what's happening now is effectively the same thing, but now looking for metals and minerals instead of oil and gas, because all of this stuff is so incredibly important for modern technology. As you said, you know, phones, computers, data centres, artificial intelligence, all of that stuff requires a lot of nickel, lithium, copper, cobalt, and a ton of obscure rare earth metals, all of which helps produce a lot of stuff that we're just going to need more and more of.

JP: And where does the U.S. find itself in this global race, right, in terms of both resource wealth and footholds in the industry?

JACOB LORINC: The reality for the U.S., as well as countries like Canada, is that we're really lagging the race to produce a lot of this material. The vast bulk of the world's mines for critical minerals are owned by China. And China also owns the vast majority of the processing and refining of these materials, all of which is required to turn this stuff into a final product. So today, even, you know, in Canada, if we mine raw lithium, it often has to be shipped to China to be processed. And that has put the U.S. and Canada at a real competitive disadvantage that gives its chief adversary quite a bit of geopolitical leverage.

JP: Some figures that I saw: China currently extracts more than 60% of rare earth elements, but to your point, processes as much as 90% of the global supply. So that's huge.

[music]

JP: Okay, so this all brings us to Canada. Whether we're talking about tariffs or threats to make us the 51st state, we have been under a lot of pressure, as everyone knows, from this administration, the Trump administration. And, you know, I think if we were to take them at face value, you would think it all has to do with how secure our border is or defence spending or getting, you know, a quote unquote, "fair shake" with trade. But earlier this month, Prime Minister Trudeau told a group of business leaders, and I want to quote this: "I suggest that not only does the Trump administration know how many critical minerals we have, but that may even be why they keep talking about absorbing us and making us the 51st state." And just first, as someone who's so steeped in this, I'm just curious, like what went through your head when you heard the prime minister say that?

JACOB LORINC: Well, it was a hair-raising comment, but I say that more as a Canadian and less as a mining reporter. I think that was maybe the first acknowledgment from the Trudeau administration that Trump was a bit more serious than perhaps they've led on to.

JP: And just give me a sense of what is our critical mineral landscape look like?

JACOB LORINC: I mean, by virtue of being a gigantic country, we just naturally have an abundance of metals and minerals. This is why, historically, Canada has really been the world's sort of top destination for mining companies and prospectors. Across the country, you know, I believe we have about three dozen critical minerals, all essential to modern technology. And so, you know, over in Quebec, we've got lithium, rare earth materials, graphite deposits. In Ontario, we've got an abundance of nickel. Sudbury is, you know, famously the birthplace of nickel. The Prairies have tons of potash and uranium, you know, which is maybe our, our more strategic points of minerals-related leverage in this moment. And, you know, over in British Columbia, we've got copper, molybdenum. On and on. So these minerals are everywhere, but we haven't necessarily been very good at mining it in recent years.

JP: And why, why is that? If there's such a race for all this stuff?

JACOB LORINC: Yeah, so there are many reasons for this, of which, you know, is sort of subject to much debate. You know, one of the reasons is that we used to actually be a big producer of a lot of these metals, and then our accessible deposits simply dried up. Sudbury used to really be the world's, you know, behemoth for nickel production. And then we dug all the nickel there. I mean, there's still some left, but not like there used to be. And so today, some of the most talked about and, you know, mineral-rich deposits that we hear about in Canada, like the Ring of Fire in northern Ontario, they're in incredibly remote areas where it's just really hard to get to, and so it's really hard to develop and build the infrastructure for. And I mean, beyond that, we're also, I think, far more considerate of other issues around mining, whether that be the environment or local groups that live around these deposits, often Indigenous groups. I think we're more conscious of this than some other countries are, which just means that sometimes these deposits are either taking a very, very long time to permit and develop, or they're never being developed at all.

[music]

JP: Earlier this month, kind of echoing the prime minister's remarks, Canada's Energy and Natural Resources Minister, Jonathan Wilkinson, said that he's been proposing to the U.S. that they enter into an energy and minerals partnership with Canada. He said the pitch was motivated by internal discussions held about Trump's desire to access our supply. And do we have any sense at the moment of what a partnership like that could look like?

JACOB LORINC: I think it's very early stages. I think we've seen the Trudeau administration keep its cards close to its chest when negotiating with Trump. So, we've seen Trudeau and Wilkinson and Premier Doug Ford all advocate for this critical minerals alliance to counter China.

SOUNDCLIP

DOUG FORD: Ontario plans to start a new Am-Can critical minerals security alliance to invest in and build out American and Canadian critical mineral supply chains, including by significantly expanding Am-Can processing capacity. We need to speed up regulatory approval timelines for current and planned critical mineral projects, with priority given to the projects that displace and replace Chinese supply.

JACOB LORINC: We don't really know what that's going to look like. They've all pledged similar items, which is to say, speeding up permit times for mines; trying to carefully deregulate in certain areas that would incentivize both mining and processing. But this is not that much different from what politicians have been saying for years. In Canada and the U.S., there's always a desire to speed up mining. Does it actually happen is a totally different question. So, you know, we've seen this idea being marketed again and even louder in the midst of all this trade uncertainty and hostilities with the U.S. We don't really know the specifics.

JP: And it's not like we weren't working with the U.S. before, right? Like I remember back in I think it was 2023, Biden came to Canada for a visit, and then there was this big announcement that, I think it was like a $250-million US fund would be opened up to Canadian and American companies looking to develop critical minerals.

SOUNDCLIP

JOE BIDEN: Canada, in particular, has large quantities of critical minerals that are essential for our clean energy future, for the world's clean energy future. And I believe we have an incredible opportunity to work together so Canada and the United States can source and supply here in North America everything we need for reliable and resilient supply chains.

[applause]

JP: Haven't we already been in some kind of alliance or some kind of partnership?

JACOB LORINC: That's right. I mean, just by virtue of being a massive trade partner to the U.S., this alliance is inherent in that. I mean, Canada supplies the U.S. with the majority of its potash, uranium, a lot of its copper, a lot of its nickel. A lot of nickel in northern Ontario goes directly to the U.S. military. So these supply chains already exist. This alliance already exists. Under Biden, we certainly saw more cross-border funding, where the Department of Defense would offer incentives to Canadian mining companies to help build up mines or processing plants. So we've already seen this partnership take hold. It's just a very slow process, and it's one that's at the whims of global commodity markets. And it's not always something that can lead to tangible results very quickly.

[music]

JP: Okay, let's move on to Greenland, uh, the other possible 51st state, according to Trump. This is an autonomous territory of Denmark and the location of America's northernmost military base. Trump has had his sights set on it for a while. He first suggested that the U.S. buy it in 2019, which was ultimately turned down by Denmark, and now he's after it again. It reached a boiling point in January. I'm sure people will remember when Don Jr. dropped into Greenland for a half-day visit.

SOUNDCLIP

DONALD TRUMP JR: Just here as tourists. Seeing it, looks like an incredible place. We've been talking about going for a while. I was actually supposed to be here last spring for some of the stuff I do in my free time. Uh, but just really excited to be here. Awesome country. The scenery coming in was just spectacular.

JP: How much of a factor are Greenland's minerals in why the U.S. is so focused on it, why Trump says he wants it?

JACOB LORINC: Yeah, so I, I mean, we can't pretend to know what exactly is going on inside the brain of Trump or his advisors. You know, we don't really know how much of this is about critical minerals versus Arctic security and control of the Northwest Passage. But we do know that Greenland is rich in rare earth materials that are important to the U.S. These are very niche, obscure metals with names like cerium or europium. In the metals world, we like to joke about a rare earth metal called unobtainium, which doesn't actually exist. But it's a testament to the fact that these are very, very obscure and hard to find. All of this stuff is used in defence and military technology, as well as routine modern technology like iPhones. I was just looking this up and saw that an F-35 fighter jet manufactured by the U.S. requires more than 900 pounds of rare earth elements, as an example. Submarine, navy submarines, require thousands of pounds of these minerals. And the Trump administration is clearly very alive to this. And, you know, I'm sure that that's a part of their focus when they're looking at Greenland. Or Canada or the Ukraine, for that matter. But there's also, I should say, you know, something of a misunderstanding to these sort of proposed conquests that I think reflect the complexity of mineral supply chains, which is that while Greenland certainly has rare earth materials, it's so remote and underdeveloped that it would take decades to actually start producing metal from that country in a meaningful way. You know, there's no profit margin whatsoever. It would require dramatic states subsidizing and incentives on behalf of the U.S., which as we know, is often so hellbent on eliminating government spending. I spend a lot of time on Bay Street talking with mining executives and investors, and... I mean, if you suggest to any of them that they try digging for rare earths in Greenland, even under a Trump annexation regime, they're going to laugh you out of the room.

JP: That was interesting. And also I just want to say, quite charming to hear about the jokes that you guys have in the metals wor- [laughter] in the metals world.

JACOB LORINC: They're very nerdy.

JP: We love nerds on this show.

[music]

JP: The war in Ukraine is entering its third year now. Members of the Trump administration have been meeting with Russian officials in Saudi Arabia to potentially broker an end to the war. It's going on this week. But this comes after his team, after Trump's team has made a demand: in exchange for continued military and economic aid to Ukraine, the U.S. gets 50% of the country's rare earth minerals. And can you take me through Ukraine's mineral wealth and how they factored into their negotiations with the U.S.?

JACOB LORINC: Yeah, so that's an interesting one, but I think is sort of similar to Greenland in that it's a bit of a head scratcher. Ukraine certainly has rare earth minerals. They're spread out across the country. But it's sort of like plenty of countries since we're all situated on top of rocks. The thing about the Ukraine is that it actually doesn't have that many mineable rare earth mineral deposits, which is to say that the rare earths that are spread out across Ukraine don't actually appear in large significant concentrations that would be economical to mine. So, I mean, again, it's very difficult to understand sort of the thinking behind the Trump administration. But these realities do make you wonder how much of these types of proposed deals are about the marketing to the American electorate -- many of whom I suspect are not up to date on global geological distributions -- to sort of say, you know, look at how we're shoring up resources to protect American interests, when in reality it doesn't appear to move the needle much. I mean, I guess-- I'm sure for the Trump administration, its thinking is that if it can just have ownership over these metals, that's, that's a very strategic, important step forwards. But there are still these missing pieces, which has to do with just the economics of mining the material, again, the economics of processing the material. Because, you know, an important question to ask with the Ukraine deal is, you know, say Zelenskyy says, yes, sure, take half our rare earth minerals and you can have them tomorrow. I mean, where will that material be processed? The answer is China. The U.S., again, does not have the processing and refining capacity to actually do anything with this stuff. So I think it's another example of, you know, sort of beyond the public bluster of this kind of sort of new-wave imperialism. The actual reshaping of supply chains to suit your geopolitical needs is profoundly more complicated.

JP: I know you've been tugging at this thread as we've been talking, and I also understand that we cannot put ourself in the mind of Donald Trump and other members of his administration. But like when you're talking to people in this world, like just how motivated do they think Trump and the people around him are vis-a-vis critical minerals? Like, you know, how much of a priority is this like when they're making moves and and, I don't know, [trying] to reshape their foreign policy agenda?

JACOB LORINC: I do think it's a real priority. I, you know. I think that the way that they present it can be very abrasive. But behind the scenes, you know, from the people I talk to in the mining world, this is really at the top of their minds. Not just in the White House, but in the State Department, in the Energy Department. A lot of the mining companies that I so routinely cover in Canada spent much of January in Washington trying to meet with State Department officials, Energy Department officials, to understand what their relationship with the U.S. would be like going forwards. And from those conversations, what I often heard was that they were sitting down with these officials who were trying to understand from the mining companies what it would take to get those mining companies to build processing plants in America, to bring refining to the U.S., to boost output of, you know, nickel, cobalt, lithium. It's something that they're really sort of drilling into that I think is... what was present under the Biden administration, but is maybe even more aggressive now.

[music]

JP: Jacob, how did China come to be so dominant in this area?

JACOB LORINC: I think you have to rewind 20, 30 years to a period of time when, like so many other products, the U.S. and Western countries were looking to outsource manufacturing and production. You know, the U.S. and Canada had a lot of environmental targets. There were a lot of... There was a strong desire to have the dirty stuff made elsewhere. And countries like China really seized on that opportunity. It's hard to build a mine in the United States because you have to build it in somebody's backyard. And that's going to take a long time to do and it's going to piss off a lot of people. It was something that the U.S. just didn't really want to do much of. And so in that period of time, especially in the early 2000s as China was really becoming a dominant global superpower, it seized on this opportunity to take losses on big, risky projects like lithium mines and cobalt mines and copper mines, where it could become a big player in these areas because the U.S. and Canada didn't want to. And that brings us to this point where the, sort of the global balance is very uneven in favour of China, which now really occupies a large portion of the market share of this area. And, you know, the U.S. and Canada now want to catch up and make up for lost time, but, you know, a lot of that was given away decades ago.

JP: And just if you could briefly explain to me, how has China worked with other resource-rich countries, and how has that approach over time differed from America's?

JACOB LORINC: Yeah, I mean, China has made really incredible inroads in countries in Africa, other countries in Southeast Asia, where big Chinese state-sponsored companies have come in and have helped build up resources and helped build up processing plants to produce tons of nickel, lithium, copper. Today we see that the epicentre of nickel production is in Indonesia. They churn out just a monstrous amount of that material, and a lot of that is subsidized by Chinese companies. And again, because, you know, China is not beholden to the free capital markets the way that the U.S. and Canada is, it means that these companies can take the risks and can take the financial losses that are required to get a large, long project like a nickel mine and a nickel processing plant up and running. And so, you know, we've seen them really double down on that in countries like Indonesia, in West Africa, in South Africa too, to really, you know, become a powerhouse in this material.

JP: Given how far ahead they are, is it even possible to catch up?

JACOB LORINC: It's hard to say. I think time will tell. I think that it's, it's not wrong for countries like the U.S. and Canada to recognize the strategic disadvantage of having these supply chains completely controlled by global adversaries. And so I think there is a sense to trying to onshore or near-shore production of these materials. Beyond the strategic importance of it, I think there are also environmental and social sort of successes associated with this. Quite famously, the nickel that is produced in Indonesia is produced at a very low, sort of regulatory standards. It has-- there are very low labour standards. There is a logic to being able to produce this material in countries like Canada where mining workers can be unionized or can produce it in a way that is maybe more environmentally savvy than in those countries. So I think that there is, there's certainly a good idea behind trying to sort of build up our own supply chains of these materials. But catching up is a somewhat Herculean ambition that if it is something that we're able to do, I believe will take decades.

JP: Okay. This was really fascinating. Jacob, thank you so much for this.

JACOB LORINC: Thanks for having me.

[Music: Theme]

JP: All right, that is all for today. I'm Jayme Poisson. Thanks so much for listening. Talk to you tomorrow.

For more Front Burner transcripts, please click here.

Is Trump coming for Canada's critical minerals? - Transcript

Social Sharing