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The Current Transcript for January 18, 2016

Host: Anna Maria Tremonti

IN THIS EPISODE

Prologue:

[Music:Theme]

SOUNDCLIP

ALEX PERRY: We went to the only functioning hospital in Mogadishu. We went to the children's ward and when we were there inside about 20 minutes, all the children around us all died one by one.

ANNA MARIA TREMONTI: Four and a half years ago journalist Alex Perry stumbled across a story he says was hiding in plain sight. The famine that was devastating southern Somali that would end up killing hundreds of thousands had less to do with the drought in the wider region and more to do with the politics of the U.S. anti-terror campaign that banned most aid groups from going in to help.

SOUNDCLIP

ALEX PERRY: This was deliberate. They were withholding aid as part of the military strategy to put pressure on al-Shabaab and the plan had worked all too well.

AMT: Today in our first half hour, Alex Perry will take us through what he and just a few others reported; that the Western war against Islamic extremist groups places our own governments and Western agencies on a morally uncomfortable crossroads and can leave them compromised. We began working on the story before this weekend's attack by al-Qaeda on Burkina Faso. Though the details of that tragic scenario are different, it too touches on the vulnerability of those providing aid, professional and volunteers alike. We’ll include that discussion as we follow up with aid organizations on the concerns Alex Perry raises in half an hour. And then in an hour we're on the infrastructure file.

SOUNDCLIP

NAHEED NENSHI: I just don't know how Prime Minister Trudeau goes to the G7 and says I'm sorry we have to stop all transportation of economic goods across this country because the bridge broke. We couldn't get to the other side.

AMT: When a problem on the Nipigon River bridge in northern Ontario severed the only highway between Western and Eastern Canada last week, the Trudeau government got a stark reminder of Canada's infrastructure woes. Today we're asking about the demands and wish lists related to government promises of 124 billion in infrastructure spending. I'm Anna Maria Tremonti and this is The Current.

Somalia 2011 famine was a U.S.-created war crime

Guests: Alex Perry, Holger Wagner, Samantha Nutt, Zaid al-Rawni

SOUNDCLIP

VOICE 1: …where it is sometimes putting politics aside. We have a humanitarian emergency. We need to serve and save life. When I come to [unintelligible],I find people clearly in need of aid and I am not able to access funds and support basically because somebody is fearing that funds we are going to access are going to show up. I think it's not humanistic. It's not very noble.

AMT: To call the 2011 famine in southern Somalia a humanitarian emergency is an understatement. More than a quarter of a million people would die as a result of that crisis and as that spokeperson for the aid agency, Islamic Relief said at the time, direly needed food aid once it was in the country was sometimes withheld from certain areas for political and military reasons. Food aid was being curtailed from going into some areas under the control of al-Shabaab, the Somali Islamist group. Journalist Alex Perry was there in southern Somalia in 2011. He investigated the story behind the starvation and it led him to some very troubling conclusions. Alex Perry has written extensively for Time Magazine and Newsweek. He has a new book it's called The Rift: A New Africa Breaks Free. And he is in Guildford, England. Hello.

ALEX PERRY: Hi Anna Maria.

AMT: Tell me about the famine that was declared in Somalia in July of 2011. How many people were starving at its height?

ALEX PERRY: At its height, it was over 3,000,000. And what was unusual about Somalia was that all of East Africa was affected by hunger but there have been two, if not three, successive droughts and it was a natural disaster that everybody knew was coming a year before. There had been a warning. There's a system in East Africa which is fairly drought prone called the Early Famine Warning System and that had been sounded a year before. Food aid being shipped around the world and stored in preparation for the disaster that everybody knew was coming and had been stocked up in northern Kenya, in Uganda in Ethiopia in Djibouti. Everywhere, in fact, except southern Somalia which was pretty curious. And it, as I say, it took very little investigation to find out what the reasons were for this kind of aid gap in southern Somalia because the Somali Prime Minister, the Somali Defense Minister, the Minister for Presidential Affairs and several others told me that essentially this was strategy. This was deliberate. They were withholding aid as part of a military strategy to put pressure on al-Shabaab, a small Islamic group in southern Somalia which at the time numbered perhaps 3000 or 4000 people. And the plan had worked all too well. Essentially to put pressure on 3000 people, over 3,000,000 had been plunged into famine and as you say, eventually a quarter million people died.

AMT: Well and let's get into the real detail of that then before we talk about the politics and the strategy. Let's talk about the dying because when you got there you were confronted with the dying right away. Tell me about the moments that you just cannot get out of your head.

ALEX PERRY: I've never seen dying like this. I mean generally conflict these days tends to be you know, pockets of concentrated suffering but this was generalized blanket's expiring. I mean for almost from the moment you left the airport people were just dying everywhere. We went to the only functioning hospital in Mogadishu. Me and Dominic Nahr, a Swiss photographer that I was working with, went to the children's ward which was a fairly small room. It had about seven or eight beds in it and that didn't make a lot of sense to us. You know so why would they have such a small room? And when we were there all the kids all died. One by one.

AMT: In the course of your visit?

ALEX PERRY: Well yes, and I mean the worst thing actually really was we were interviewing people, we were working. Dominic was taking pictures and I was talking to some of the mothers of some of the kids that were lying in the beds and I'm pretty sure I was talking to one mother when her boy died. It's almost you know, you hate to bring yourself in your own feelings into this amount of suffering but you know, it was hard to deal with. It's still hard to deal with. I couldn't shake this idea that I was in this small room with these kids that were dying. And the room must be filled with their last breaths. And so therefore Dominic and I must be breathing in their last breath. You know it's a really odd thought but it was, it was one that I just couldn't shake you know? I mean actually to this day I still think about that a lot. We followed one of the boys that died when we were in the children's ward. We followed his body being taken out and washed and buried. The washing is very meticulous. It's head to toe, it's very gentle it's quite dignified. You know it's all done under a cloth. But there was a moment when the cloth was all wet and I could see the silhouette of the child that had died. And my God, you know the thinness was just extraordinary. I mean this this kid's wrists were thinner than my fingers. The body was you know, the ribcage, it was the size of a rabbit. It was extraordinary to think of that experience that so many people went through. I mean a quarter of a million. You know famine kills young children and old people so it was like a children's genocidal mess. And you know what we saw was just a fraction of what was going on for months across southern Somalia. You know the suffering that we saw, the dying the sheer amount of dying. I mean let me give you another example. There were so many refugees as well so many people fleeing and looking for help that it was quite common to find a situation for a mother say to bury her child and to go back to the spot where she buried her child the day before. And for her not to be able to find the grave because of the refugee camp of starving people that had appeared over the spot overnight.

AMT: There were that many people going into Mogadishu in trouble right there?

ALEX PERRY: You know, tens of thousands arriving every day and they’d arrive and there was no aid. There was no help. They were coming for something that wasn't there and they were just dying.

AMT: OK, so this was happening and we're talking 2011 and I'm sure that many of the people listening to you right now say how did we miss that? So let's talk a little bit about all of this. What was the commonly accepted reason given for why that famine was happening?

ALEX PERRY: Oh you know, what you might remember there was a fairly big aid campaign around it and certainly in Europe and I'm pretty sure in Canada and the U.S. as well. There was a big advertising campaign by aid organizations whose basic line was there's another famine in Africa, it's horrendous. Send us you know, money and we will help fix it. And that narrative which is about sort of African helplessness and Western generosity, right? It's almost completely wrong. This was a famine deliberately caused. It was a strategy to put pressure on Shabaab, which by the way was dreamt up by the U.S., the Somali government was merely the implementer. But the U.S. had the position and influence; to enforce a food aid ban on southern Somalia to put pressure on al-Shabaab. And the way they did that was it went to all the major Western aid agencies and made the argument that sending food aid to an area where al-Shabaab operated was a form of support to a prescribed terrorist group because in the past al-Shabaab had been known to steal food aid.

AMT: OK, I'll stop I'm going to stop you right there. al-Shabaab, let's just remind everybody, is the military arm of the Islamic Courts that were the government that was running Mogadishu that the United States and Western countries were opposed to.

ALEX PERRY: Right. al-Shabaab has aligned itself to al-Qaeda.

AMT: So they were designated a terrorist organization by the United States.

ALEX PERRY: Right, and by this stage you know, the U.S. had being attacking al-Shabaab for about four or five years with drone strikes, with assassinations. al-Shabaab was one of the groups which the U.S. was prosecuting its war on terror.

AMT: OK. So then we get we see this drought that affects Somalia and the surrounding countries.

ALEX PERRY: Right. In fact, 12,000,000 people.

AMT: OK, but the one place that gets a blockade is the area that is controlled by where al-Shabaab is.

ALEX PERRY: That's right. That's right.

AMT: And what your reporting showed is that it's U.S. policy.

ALEX PERRY: Yeah. It's U.S. policy. And as I say, that wasn't hard to prove. The Somali government at the time which was a transitional government full of well meaning but reasonably inexperienced Somalis who weren't actually generally politicians, were very candid about what they were doing. You know this was the famine. The famine was their strategy. They were using a blockade of food to put pressure on Shabaab.

AMT: Remind us at the time because you did document this. You do have people on the record. Remind us that the time you got on the record on this.

ALEX PERRY: So the Somali Prime Minister. The Somali Defense Minister. So the two guys, the most senior people in that government, the Minister of Presidential Affairs. There was a Canadian ethnic Somali who was a military advisor. Before I even went to Somalia there was an aid worker, an Australian aid worker who worked for a Somali aid group, who was the first actually to sort of tip me off to what was going on. Like every other reporter that went to Somalia at the time, I assumed this was the normal narrative of famine in Africa which is a desperately poor countries occasionally being tipped into disaster you know, by natural events. I blithely began our conversation sort of laying out that kind of narrative and he just cut me off and said you don't understand what's going on here. This is an American blockade. This is a deliberate, you know, military strategy that has worked too well. And in fact the U.S. realized in the end what was going on and rescinded its aid ban and told the aid groups that they could resume food aid deliveries to Somalia. But by the end of July 2011 when the famine was at its height and it was just too late. You know food aid take several months to transport around the world and the aid groups themselves actually seem to use that weakening in the U.S. position to argue back at the U.S. and sort of say you must never do this again but you know, whatever the effect of that was that the aid blockade continue.

AMT: So when you when you got confirmation of this from the defense minister, you specifically ask questions. What did they tell you? Tell us what they actually said about the strategy. How did they justify it?

ALEX PERRY: They said Shabaab has no food, it weakens them. And they can't fight us. I mean it was it was one of those sort of weird conversations you have when you're saying My God, you’re causing a famine and the guy looks at you and goes, Well of course we are! You know it's working really well and the thing was it was working really well. Shabaab, when I first got there had just pulled out of Mogadishu the week before. They'd been in the city continually for five years you know. Finally they've been pushed out and they were pushed out because they were so weak because of the famine, of course. You know, but the collateral damage to this was 3,000,000 people in starvation.

AMT: Talk to me a little bit about the aid organizations because you also confronted them. The aid organizations were told they could not go in so they just didn't.

ALEX PERRY: Right. So my understanding of what happened is essentially the aid organizations resisted but when the U.S. reminded all of them that it was their biggest donor, they fell into line. Since the famine, there has has been a little bit of rewriting of history. I mean, that at the time the aid agencies didn't mention any of this. And in fact you know went on to do these blanket advertising around the world saying you know, send us money using pictures of the famine. Saying that they could help fix this. They weren't present. They weren't there. They were using pictures of starving people to raise money which they then used on aid campaigns elsewhere. Maybe in the East African famine, but they weren't present they had no ability to fix a famine. Since then, OXFAM in particular, has accused the U.S. of causing that famine.

AMT: Now in fairness, didn't al-Shabaab also want to keep you and agencies out?

ALEX PERRY: They were split on that. Some of them had taken that very rigid Islamic line, we don't need any Western help we don't want it. And there had been sort of intermittent attempts by al-Shabaab actually to set up its own kind of aid wing, its own N.G.O. wing. But when the scale of the famine became apparent, al-Shabaab was split. Some commanders were saying we shouldn't let aid in but others were letting aid in and in fact you know, Medecins sans Frontieres, which is one of the more open and transparent N.G.O.s out there, published a book around this time talking about the dilemmas it had in terms of meeting al-Shabaab on the road when it was operating in Somalia and and operating in an area where it knew that some of its aid would end up in the hands of al-Shabaab.

AMT: Well I want to ask you about that because how do you respond to those who would say that sending aid into areas controlled by al-Shabaab risked having it hijacked and used to promote their terrorist agenda?

ALEX PERRY: I think you know there is that risk and there is no doubt that some would be hijacked. But frankly, if the alternative is a quarter of a million civilians dying, I know which side I'm on.

AMT: Well, you write that since the end of the Second World War the policy of the U.S. government and its Somali allies was, and I'm quoting, “a war crime that ranked only behind the genocides in Cambodia and Rwanda”.

ALEX PERRY: Right. Well, denying food to people as a military strategy is a war crime. And that's what happened. The scale of this crime, as I say 258,000 people, over a quarter million, that puts it right up there with the Khmer Rouge; the genocide in Rwanda. What is remarkable about this is nobody knows this. Nobody knows this.

AMT: We're going to get to that because you were reporting this. You were one of the few although you say there was another, there were other reporters who got into the World Food Program storage areas and what did they find?

ALEX PERRY: Yeah there was a Dutch crew that went into a World Food Program warehouse and found some of the missing food aid. There was this warehouse that had mountains of grain sacks. You know, corridors. It was--and nobody can understand why wasn't it leaving the warehouse? Why wasn't it being pushed out? Even just a few hundred yards there were starving people.

AMT: But it was part of this blockade in other words?

ALEX PERRY: Yeah it was, but yeah I mean it was it was more evidence of the same blockade. The difficulty here for so many people, and I would include myself-- You know I went to Somalia to do a story on another African famine. And it was only by chance that I met an aid worker who set me straight really. But the point is that the power of our narrative, the power of our perceptions of Africa, that it is a place where people starve and kindly Westerners come in and help out. It's so set that it's very hard to overcome it. Whether your audience who's reading these stories or frankly even if you're the journalist in the field writing them. Because the Somalis on the ground don't really know why they're starving they just know they're starving. But the people who are aware of the bigger picture are fairly few and far between. If you don't go in and ask those questions and meet the right people and sort of say, is this part of a deliberate military strategy, you're not going to find out. And frankly, who's going to ask those questions because it's so outlandish.

AMT: Alex, I have to say, it's so troubling to think this was going on. Why didn't we ask more questions?

ALEX PERRY: Yeah, well, it is kind of extraordinary. Look—

AMT: And you wrote about it in Time Magazine. Why didn't all whole bunch of other news organizations pick up what you were writing?

ALEX PERRY: Okay, I mean, I think there's two things here. One is, you know, that sort of very fixed perception. I mean, essentially-- And there’s something wrong with our idea of charity. I think that's where it all comes from. It is charities become about us, about the givers, about how wonderful we are, about how generous we are. If you talk about aids and charity in the West, you’re almost always talking about how much. How much should we be giving? Shouldn't we be giving more? Shouldn't we be nicer people? Those who are not going to give, they're nasty people, they're mean people. That's the debate. And actually, what that debate does is focus all the attention on us and those on the receiving end, often Africans, are suddenly the objects in their own story. We’re the subjects in their story; they're the objects. We really don't pay much attention to them. We don't pay much attention to whether what we're doing is going to help or going to harm. And, you know, we don't-- The idea that what we are doing might be part of some horrible war crime just wouldn't occur to anybody. So you know that's that one problem there is the hardness of our perceptions.

AMT: And you wrote about this and none of us picked up on it.

ALEX PERRY: Yeah, isn’t that amazing? I mean, you know, we ran this over ten pages in Time Magazine, the biggest circulation English language news magazine on the planet. You know, I lead my book with it. Every op-ed that I've written on the back of the book mentions this. And it has gone unnoticed. You know, I was expecting a firestorm from the State Department, who were primarily responsible for this policy, from all the aid agencies. Nothing, nothing. You know, and it tells me that it's a really uncomfortable thing for a journalist to confront, that our misperceptions are so set that they persist even after you disprove them with facts. I mean, this is horrible news for a journalist: The facts and not enough, that perceptions are way more powerful than reality, that our perceptions are so off when it comes to Africa that we can look at a famine the most powerful Western government deliberately caused and we can see it as a moment for our generosity rather than a moment where we should, frankly, do some serious self-examination.

AMT: So, do you see any similarities between what happened in Somalia and how hunger is being used in Syria today against rebel-held areas?

ALEX PERRY: Well, there’s similarities in that food is a weapon and is being used as a weapon all over the world. Syria is a good example. You know, the recent blockade on [unintelligible], just over the border from Lebanon. Food aid is also being used as a weapon being blockaded in Yemen to the south. You know, it has long been the case. What's unusual about Somalia is it's not often that you find an instance where the West is using food as a weapon. And so that asks some very fundamental questions about the independence of aid and about, really, whether NGOs today have moved so far from their original founding points, which was as non-governmental organizations. Are they essentially the implementers of Western foreign policy?

AMT: So, if your analysis is correct, could members of the Obama administration being arrested for war crimes for what happened in Somalia?

ALEX PERRY: I'd say so, yeah, yeah. I mean, denying food, using starving people as a weapon of war is a war crime. And the statute that is pretty clear. So, yes. On the other hand, is it ever going to happen? No, because there are real double standards here in terms of who gets prosecuted for war crimes, who the human rights groups go after. Africans are increasingly upset because the people on trial at the Hague, for instance, are almost exclusively African. Why is that? Because they're the ones who are living in countries weak enough to be able to be pushed around.

AMT: We are in a US presidential election year. Your original reporting and the work you're doing now that you've just released in this book points to the Obama administration, specifically the State Department as well, which was at the time under Hillary Clinton. Is there any accountability being brought forward there? Do you expect any accountability?

ALEX PERRY: Well, look, you know, I'm trying, I'm trying. I mean, on an individual basis these people who caused this disaster need to be told what they did. I want to tell them what I saw.

AMT: Alex Perry, thank you.

ALEX PERRY: Thank you.

AMT: That is Alex Perry. He's the author of The Rift: A New Africa Breaks Free and he spoke to us from Gilford, England. Now, once again, we did contact the U.S. State Department for its response to Alex Perry's allegations. It did not respond directly. It did send us a government policy released in 2011 and we have posted a link to that on our website cbc.ca/thecurrent. We've also posted links to some of Alex Perry's reporting along with photos taken by his colleague Dominic Nar for Time Magazine in Somalia in 2011. And we also reached out to the Somali government through its newly opened embassy in the United States. We have not heard back. Now, in 2013, three US members of Congress, two Republicans and one Democrat, introduced a bill that would prevent famine, such as the one in Somalia, from occurring again. It was called the Humanitarian Assistance Facilitation Act. It would have allowed for organizations, such as Oxfam, to bring humanitarian aid to people suffering in any area, including those held by terrorist groups or groups that are labeled terrorist groups. That bill did not pass. Joining me to discuss Oxfam's response to the 2011 Somali famine is Holger Wagner. He is Oxfam's Regional Director for East, Central, the Horn of Africa. He joins us from Nairobi, Kenya. Hello.

HOLGER WAGNER: Good morning, Anna Maria and good morning to all the listeners.

AMT: What is your response to what Alex Perry has to say about Oxfam's response to the crisis in Somalia?

HOLGER WAGNER: Well, I think what Alex points out is that there were a number of mistakes made in that response in 2011. Now, collectively, I think there was a failure of the aid organizations, of governments, of donors, of the general public to respond to the famine on time. I mean, it was chronic situation. Famine is not new to the area, so there's always a possibility off a famine, of course, much less than drought, to hit the area. And I think what Alex is pointing out as he has discovered other reasons that may have not been looked at by other organizations. Certainly, not by, I think, by the aid community, by the aid organizations this point that may have led to a delay. And I think Oxfam and also Save the Children came out in early 2012 for the document called A Dangerous Delay where we also very self-critically as aid organizations looked at the situation and did say that it was unacceptable that so many people suffered and that aid reached affected areas and communities at a much later stage than they should. So I think that would Alex is saying is there is possibly other reasons that led to that. For Oxfam, I think, it's clear that as an aid organization we were not in a position to be as quickly on time with our delivery as the people in Somalia deserved at that moment in time.

AMT: Now, he also says that Oxfam accused the US of causing the famine at the time.

HOLGER WAGNER: I must say, Anna Maria, I'm not personally aware of that accusation levelled at the US government by Oxfam. We'd have to look at this closer to see in what way has Oxfam responded in that way. As far as Oxfam is concerned, our main focus in a disaster or humanitarian response of that nature is not likely to be the direct delivery of food or any kind of direct hand out of food. We probably approach this from a multi-day angle, from looking at both humanitarian assistance in terms of livelihoods, of water and sanitation, nutrition- especially for children, especially those under five years old. It's probably a different approach that Oxfam would use in a situation like that. Probably not looking at direct food distribution, so it may well have been not an immediate concern of Oxfam to look at what has been stored or warehoused within a WFP responsibilities or their normal way of responding.

AMT: Okay. In fact, Oxfam doesn't deliver food. Oxfam delivers infrastructure and other areas of help. Am I right?

HOLGER WAGNER: Yeah. Oxfam mainly is looking at responses that deal with water and sanitation. Sometimes water trucking if no other method can get water to the affected communities quick enough. And with water always comes a need for sanitation training, training on proper hygiene to prevent further outbreaks of diseases or any type of health-related issues.

AMT: So, how do you respond to his allegation that Oxfam was using pictures of starving children that suggested you were bringing in food aid? Do you accept that criticism?

HOLGER WAGNER: I must say Oxfam has been very careful over the years to always project a positive light and in disaster even provide some sort of light and positive elements, so I’d be surprised if Oxfam would have gone ahead with the parochial starving child as a beginning of a fundraising campaign. It may have been. I don't know the first image that was used out of the 2011famine by Oxfam, but over the years I think Oxfam has really tried to put a positive side, showcasing the community, showcasing the individuals in that rather than using what normally is used for emotional purposes. Of course, a starving child may, of course, trigger much quicker emotional reaction than any other image, but I'm not aware of Oxfam having used a starving child as its first image when it started public awareness about this issue in fundraising. It’s probably rather a different type of image.

AMT: Does the anti-terrorism policy of the US government still hinder Oxfam's work in some parts of the world?

HOLGER WAGNER: Well, I think for Oxfam, Oxfam does not accept US funding. It does not accept USAid funding. It does except humanitarian funding on occasion to the Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance, also an arm of the government. Of course, any government has the right to attach stipulations to funds that it provides and, of course, the aid organizations need to find a way to work with these stipulations, but also work with them in such a way that aid can be delivered to areas that are affected and help the population, especially women and children. I think, today, any money that Oxfam accepts comes with that type of cautious stipulation, which is normal, but it doesn't hinder Oxfam’s ability to respond. We have adapted our monitoring mechanisms, our mechanisms of stewardship, of donor funds. We go with the time of changes and we make sure that we fulfill our humanitarian mandate, which is to provide help with an impartial way to the most affected areas and that is done with any funding that is made available to us.

AMT: Mr. Wagner, thank you for speaking with me today.

HOLGER WAGNER: Thank you very much, Anna Maria.

AMT: That is Holger Wagner. He is the Oxfam Regional Director for East, Central, and the Horn of Africa. He joined us from Nairobi, Kenya. Well, let's bring in two more perspectives on both the Somali famine of 2011 and what the US policy preventing organizations from working in areas controlled by prescribed extremist groups is all about. Samantha Nutt is the Founder and Executive Director of War Child Canada and Zaid al-Rawni is the chief executive officer of Islamic Relief Canada. They're both in Toronto. Mr. al-Rawni is here in our studio. Samantha Nutt is on the line. Hello to you both.

SAMANTHA NUTT: Good morning.

ZAID AL-RAWNI: Good morning.

AMT: Samantha Nutt, let's begin with you. What do you think of the conclusions Alex Perry draws about the actions of the US government in Somalia being a war crime?

SAMANTHA NUTT: I have to be honest, Anna Maria. I mean, first, I should actually preface my comments by saying that War Child is not a relief organization. I have myself worked extensively in Somalia, in particular during the famine in the ‘90s, so I'm very familiar with that context, but we don't engage in food aid, so I am somewhat of an impartial observer here. In terms of some of some of his comments, I do agree with much of what he said in the context that there's something very wrong with our idea of charity and the way that we approach it, that we often don't recognize our own complicity and our own hypocrisies in that equation. On the issue of war crimes, I think that certainly there is reason to proceed with what, I believe, should be much more fulsome examination of the policies and decision-making that led or may have exacerbated this crisis. I think, for many organizations on the ground in Somalia, it is the most complicated humanitarian environment to work in. The security environment is appalling and so it's very difficult for organizations to operate. And my personal feeling is that that would have been the overarching impediment and the larger calculation that would have affected decision-making when it came to organizations on the ground and their capacity to respond. We can get into a discussion around US policy as it relates to their material support for terrorism clauses and what that means, but really I think in terms of the war crime, unfortunately, bad policies and stupid decision-making don't constitute a war crime. If they did, there’d be any number of governments on trial at The Hague. But it is a situation we should be examining.

AMT: Okay, well, Zaid al-Rawni, you were actually in Somalia during that famine because Islamic Relief was in there and you personally were in there, were you not?

ZAID AL-RAWNI: I was in there before the famine was declared a famine. I was there in 2010 and 09.

AMT: Okay. And do you think Alex Perry has a point? Did the US commit a war crime by curtailing food?

ZAID AL-RAWNI: Look, we have international humanitarian laws. The nub of these laws or the heart of these laws is two principles: Impartiality and neutrality. For aid like ours, if we deviate from these two fundamental principles- impartiality and neutrality- then we get into very muddy waters. And policies of, not just the US but other governments across the globe, when they when they confuse these lines, when they don't adhere to these principles then it becomes very difficult to respond on the basis of a humanitarian imperative. Now, Islamic Relief, we continue to operate, despite the global challenges, within Somalia, even some of the most hard to reach places, because these two principles are ones that guide our response. And we are a relief agency, so we continue to operate despite that.

AMT: So, how did Islamic Relief work with or around al-Shabaab to get food to starving Somalis?

ZAID AL-RAWNI: Negotiation, negotiate access. I mean, we understand the risks and there are very, very real risks. And we understand some of these characters we're dealing with are unsavory characters. But as Alex Perry says, the alternative is to watch and literally, physically watch children starve to death. And that is not an alternative we chose to accept as the only alternative.

AMT: How did you make sure you weren't used by al-Shabaab?

ZAID AL-RAWNI: Well, negotiation, negotiation and communication. Firstly, there's no cash transfers. We're talking about delivering trucks of aid. And then before we bring the trucks in there’s so many discussions and so many negotiations. And for many of these people in al-Shabaab held areas, it’s their families who are starving, it's their people, it's their tribes. And so it’s saying to them this food will reach people who you know who might not wake up tomorrow morning if you do not allow this food in. It can sometimes be a compelling argument and allow you access that otherwise would be denied.

AMT: Okay. But, I mean, we know that sometimes to get five trucks through one truck goes missing. Does that happen?

ZAID AL-RAWNI: I'm sure there's a risk of it happening and I'm sure this case is where it has happened. But in our case, especially, the funding that we provided, we were very, very careful to ensure that the people who were receiving the food, we were there, we were part of the distribution. We were part of the needs assessment, so even before the trucks arrived we counted how many families need support. How much does that translate into food packs? How many trucks do we need? And then we are there, we are responding, we’re giving the food out physically to the people. So there’s mitigating these risks. There’s things you can do to try and really avoid these real potential risks and pitfalls.

AMT: Okay, Samantha Nutt, we're talking about this specific thing in Somalia in 2011 and the deaths of a quarter of a million people, but we can also see examples today where there are starving people that's hard to get in aid. Should aid organizations work with extremist groups if, in the end, so many people can be saved?

SAMANTHA NUTT: Well, I think this is, as has been mentioned, it is a very difficult calculation and unfortunately all aid can follow the laws of unintended consequences. The simple reality is that to operate in the most at-risk environments where people are facing the greatest need; unfortunately, you do have to sometimes gain permission from some of the belligerents to the conflict. You have to negotiate for the safety and security of your staff. And this isn't just true in Somalia. It's true in Syria. It’s true in Iraq. It's true in South Sudan. All around the world. And it is the case that sometimes aid gets misappropriated and you have to be able to monitor and evaluate and so you do need that safe passage. Unfortunately, we always try to maximize our good intentions, each and every single one of us, but there aren't any guarantees and we're operating in humanitarian environment that becomes more and more complicated every day as we saw with the attacks in Burkina Faso over the weekend.

AMT: Well, and I'll get to that in a second. Are there Canadian government restrictions on Canadian aid organizations operating in areas controlled by extremist organizations now, Samantha Nutt?

SAMANTHA NUTT: There are always restrictions on aid and there are always accountabilities to those donors. People want to be sure that their money is going to the people who are in greatest need. And, unfortunately, with Bill C-51 as well some of that legislation isn't clear. It's not as complex as, for example, the US situation where the law is very clear around- or much more clear- around the material support for terrorism. At the same time, there isn't a single example of any relief agency that has been charged under the material support for terrorism act in United States or elsewhere for delivering humanitarian aid that may have been co-opted by some of these armed groups.

AMT: Okay. And I'll just remind our listeners, C-51, of course, is the anti-terror act that of the Liberals voted for and that Prime Minister Trudeau has said he will change. Justin Trudeau said he would change when he was campaigning and were waiting to see what those changes might be. Let's get to Burkina Faso, because even though it is not the same kind of aid we're talking about we can't ignore the weekend attack by al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb. Six Canadians, all from Quebec, volunteering for a humanitarian mission for a religious congregation were killed. What does it say about the dangers to aid workers and humanitarian volunteers and what they face, Samantha Nutt?

SAMANTHA NUTT: It's becoming much more complicated every day. It's something that we are all wrestling with. It is changing the nature of aid. It is changing our capacity to respond. We are facing-- There are more and more humanitarian aid workers every day that are being killed in the line of duty that are taking, unfortunately, extraordinary risks, that are being raped, that are being abused, kidnapped, held for ransom. And, in fact, the kidnapping and ransom of foreigners is a very, has been a very lucrative business for many of these armed groups, al-Qaeda, ISIS, and others. And, unfortunately, the notion that a humanitarian, a neutral humanitarian space exists is being eroded each and every single day and the impact on civilians, you're talking about millions of lives that are at stake here.

ZAID AL-RAWNI: Well, just to add to that, the real challenges we're facing are real everywhere. Burkina Faso is just the latest example, the latest manifestation of some of the complex risks that aid workers are taking globally. And people aren’t going to stop volunteering, helping, supporting people in need. They have to be saluted because they are taking real life risks and as far as we're concerned at Islamic Relief we'll continue to take these risks because the alternative again is to allow and watch and be a bystander to children, mothers, the elderly perishing and that isn't one we can stomach.

AMT: And what are you seeing in Syria right now with Islamic Relief?

ZAID AL-RAWNI: Lots of difficulties, lots of people who-- I mean, in Madaya and in other parts in the north and the south, everywhere, you know, the humanitarian situation in Syria is, for want of a better word, disgusting. It really is inexcusable that so many millions of people are facing such basic-- I mean, the winter, the cold, the biting cold will kill several children this winter. Starvation is already hurting so many people. And so our response can’t be one where we look at the risks that aid workers face and say, well, not for me. We have to be brave and say, well, we have to respond and we have to be real in our response and genuine in our response.

AMT: And so, Samantha Nutt, we're almost out of time, just briefly, given the dangers and the complications what can be done to make sure withholding food isn't used as a weapon of war?

SAMANTHA NUTT: I think that we need to continue to push for more transparency. We need reporters like Alex who are out there on the front lines and who are bringing this information back. We need to look at those policies and push governments for changes and also to make sure that the legislation around support for terrorist groups, directly and indirectly, so that is clear for aid organizations on the ground. At the same time, we also need to, I think, give differently. One of the great points I think that Alex made with when he said that there's something wrong with our idea of charity. We respond to some of these crises but if you really want to avert a catastrophe, such as a famine, it is a long term investment to reduce the vulnerability of those groups.

AMT: Okay. We have to leave it there. Thank you both for weighing in on this. Samantha Nutt, Founder and Executive Director of War Child Canada; Zaid al-Rawni, Chief Executive Officer of Islamic Relief Canada, both joining me in Toronto.

Competition fierce for a slice of the infrastructure budget to fund projects

Guests: Chief Isadore Day, Tim Ross, Matti Siemiatycki

ANNA MARIA TREMONTI: Hello, I'm Anna Maria Tremonti, this is The Current.

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NAHEED NENSHI: At a time when interest rates are as low as they can mathematically be, at a time when our construction costs are starting to come down from incredibly overheated levels, at a time when people are out of work, the single smartest thing we can do is invest in the stuff that we need to build anyway. Whether it's roads, or public transit, or water systems, or affordable housing. So that's really what I'm looking to the provincial and federal governments, and their budgets, to help us with. And I think that's the number one thing government can do right now.

AMT: Well, that is the mayor of Calgary, Naheed Nenshi, speaking on The Current last week about the kind of infrastructure spending he'd like to see from the federal government. Of course, Prime Minister Justin Trudeau’s Liberals campaigned on a promise to do just that. They have committed big money, 124 billion dollars over the next ten years on infrastructure. And since last fall's election, the PM and his ministers have been fanning out across the country talking up those plans. Last Wednesday was Toronto mayor John Tory's turn to share a stage with Mr. Trudeau.

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JUSTIN TRUDEAU: One of the things that we campaigned on is recognizing that Canada needs more jobs and greater growth. That's what we put forward as a plan to invest in infrastructure, specifically through transit, through green infrastructure, through social infrastructure, and Minister Sohi and others have been engaged very closely with the mayor, and with officials here at city hall, to ensure that we're spending on the right things to both create jobs and economic activity right now, but also lead towards greater prosperity and growth in the medium and long term. We're going to do this right, we're going to do this responsibly, and we're going to get it done the right way.

JOHN TORY: And I can only say in response to that, as well, James, that the Prime Minister and I discussed the fact that in the area of housing, for example, and especially Toronto community housing, we are ready to move.

AMT: Toronto, and plenty of other jurisdictions across the country, are ready to move. And with parliament set to reconvene one week from today, there's going to be a lot of pressure on the government to get specific about where those promised infrastructure billions will actually go. We'll be hearing about some of the different interests looking for government investment across the country today, but we'll start with Chief Isadore Day. He is the regional chief for Ontario at the Assembly of First Nations. He's looking for Ottawa to invest in his community, and surrounding communities, to combat the impact of climate change. Chief Isadore Day joins me in our Toronto studio, good morning, welcome.

CHIEF ISADORE DAY: Good morning. Anna Maria.

AMT: How has climate change affected access to your community and the surrounding region?

CHIEF ISADORE DAY: Well, we're talking about 31 first nation communities, Anna-Maria, in the remote North of the province of Ontario. I represent 133 First Nations, so 31 of those communities need winter road access, because currently they do not have a connection to the rest of Canada. What this does is it poses a problem where you need to have access to the south, you need to have access to other communities in the North, to cut the cost of living. So essentially, these roads are vital to the to the cost of living, and to ensure that there's supports in the North. And right now, climate change is affecting that.

AMT: Winter roads, are we talking ice roads, are we talking more salt? Like, what are winter roads?

CHIEF ISADORE DAY: Yes, right now, all of those remote communities do not have access to one another, and they don't have access to the south. So they wait for the winter time, and usually there's anywhere between 60 and 80 days where they can actually have winter roads that connect them to the south, and connect them to one another. Because of climate change, that's not happening. And it's just been in the recent last week or two where we've had the temperatures needed to actually make those winter roads, and that certainly doesn't bode well for the time that they need to be connected.

AMT: So usually 60 to 80 days, what do you estimate you’re going to get this year?

CHIEF ISADORE DAY: Anywhere from 20 to maybe 35, 40 days.

AMT: Wow. And what comes in on those roads?

CHIEF ISADORE DAY: Well, you need to think that from the south, you'll get fuel coming in, you'll get food, you'll get also programs and services, access to those programs and services. So people leaving the South to go for medical treatments, or for other appointments. And what this does in the wintertime is it cuts the cost, because these remote communities generally only have access to air flight, and that's simply too cost prohibitive.

AMT: So what do you seeing right now, what happens to people in communities when the roads aren't available until later than they’re expected?

CHIEF ISADORE DAY: You're going to see issues around the high cost of fuel, the high cost of food. Not being able to get out. And when an individual doesn't have the wherewithal and the financial means to subsidize their income and cost of living, it's going to affect the home. It's also going to affect the First Nation, because the First Nation also relies on a certain period of time to get building materials in, to get fuel, to get other supplies in.

AMT: I was just going to ask about that, construction materials, anything that has to come in, right? Not solely food, but clothing.

CHIEF ISADORE DAY: Yes.

AMT: [interposing] Construction stuff…

CHIEF ISADORE DAY: Lumber, septic tanks, you name it. The First Nations depend on these winter roads, and when they're not there, the community feels it.

AMT: So what do you need? How do you fix that?

CHIEF ISADORE DAY: First of all, what we need is a commitment from the federal government, the provincial government, to study this thing. And not study it for the for the fact that it's going to support a mining development, or another natural resource development, but they need a study that's going to look at the social and economic impact of climate change on the communities. And that's the first step.

AMT: And now, you speak about mining developments, that's the area where, they call it the ring of fire, right? There is mining development that's expected, or that's underway up in that part of Northern Ontario, right?

CHIEF ISADORE DAY: Yes, that’s just one area, Anna-Maria. There are other areas, like the Victor Diamond Mine in Attawapiskat, there are other proposed mining developments in the far North. But the problem is, is that the First Nations community should not depend on economic development to have access. I believe because First Nations are a part of the rest of Canada, then they should be connected, just like everybody else. And they should have a quality of life just like other Canadians.

AMT: And how much money do you think the federal government needs to put into this?

CHIEF ISADORE DAY: Right now, that's speculative. And it's something that we're not prepared to put out there. We need to get the studies done. So the reality is, is what we're looking for right now, is we need to get that study done, we need to look at the social and the economic impact, and what the cost is going to be to actually impact that in a positive way, and get the right investments in place.

AMT: So essentially, you need to be on the radar, so that you are considered, and given the green light.

CHIEF ISADORE DAY: Absolutely.

AMT: And now, we're talking about Northern Ontario, this must be playing out in other parts of Canada.

CHIEF ISADORE DAY: Oh, sure it is. Climate change is affecting everybody, everywhere. Where it's being felt the most is in the remote North. This is not just in Ontario. It's in Manitoba, it's in Alberta, it's in British Columbia. You name it. All remote First Nation communities are feeling this, and they've been feeling it for a number of years. It's now just more prominent because of COP21. It was just a few months back, where all jurisdictions across the globe were talking about climate change, and indigenous people were saying, listen, you need to listen to us, because we're feeling it the most in our communities.

AMT: And you have been in talks with the government. What's the response so far?

CHIEF ISADORE DAY: So far, we've got soft commitments. We've got a prime minister, again, just in the lead up to this interview we heard the prime minister talk about prosperity. The prime minister also realizes that there's a quality of life issue in the North, and that there's now a need to focus on First Nations and bring everybody up to the same level and cost of living.

AMT: Okay, Chief Day, thanks for coming in.

CHIEF ISADORE DAY: Thank you.

AMT: Chief Isadore Day, he is the regional chief for Ontario at the Assembly of First Nations. He joined me in our Toronto studio. Well, as you heard earlier, social housing was one of Toronto mayor John Tory's infrastructure funding priorities. And of course, affordable housing is not just a big city problem, it is something affecting communities of all sizes, from coast to coast to coast. Tim Ross is the executive director of the New Brunswick Non Profit Housing Association. He's looking for help from the federal government to create and maintain social housing units. Tim Ross is in Ottawa, hello.

TIM ROSS: Good morning.

AMT: How much needs to be invested in social housing in your province?

TIM ROSS: Well, in New Brunswick, there's 29,565 households who don't have an affordable place to call home. And on top of that, there's about 14,000 households of social housing, where federal operating subsidies are set to expire over the next twenty years. So we do require a significant investment in affordable and social housing in order to keep roofs over people's heads who are vulnerable in our communities, but also to build new housing to meet the demand for affordable and social housing.

AMT: So are you talking about apartments, condos, separate housing, senior citizens homes, what are you talking?

TIM ROSS: You need a lot of different tools in the toolkit in order to meet the housing need in our communities, and it looks different depending on where you are in the province. In St. Stephen, for example, just next door to where the federal cabinet is meeting, 37 percent of households are renters in St. Stephen, New Brunswick. And one in five of those renter households are spending more than 50 percent of their income on rent. So we do need more apartment buildings, we need mixed income developments. We need housing for seniors, because there's a silver tsunami approaching New Brunswick. But we also need housing for more vulnerable members of our community, such as individuals who have experienced homelessness. You know, there's a need to invest in transitional housing for youth, which is quite a serious need in our communities, considering just last week we learned that. Safe Harbor in Saint John, a transitional housing facility for youth, will be closing its doors not even a year after opening up because of a lack of operating funds. So when we're talking about infrastructure investments, and we're talking about stimulus, we need to consider the full lifecycle costs in supporting these important operations in our communities.

AMT: What's the fallout if you don't get the funding you need, how will the communities be affected?

TIM ROSS: Well, if you don't have a safe affordable place to call home, finding and keeping a job, raising a family, aging with dignity, or completing an education, are pretty much impossible. So we face the risk of excluding members from our community because, you know, having a safe, affordable place to call home is that pathway to the middle class. It's the pathway to social and economic inclusion. So we run the risk of escalating costs in various emergency and institutional services due to poor health comes, criminal justice interactions, and outright exclusion in our communities. So there's an opportunity here, once in a lifetime, to renew the federal government's role in building affordable housing. Over the last 25 years, there's been a 46 percent reduction in terms of output of housing units, due to the lack of federal investment. So we want to partner with Ottawa, and with our provincial government here, to protect the existing social housing homes that we have, to build new affordable housing for those who need it, and to transform our affordable housing sector, so that it's more responsive to the 21st century needs of New Brunswickers.

AMT: And how does what you are looking at in New Brunswick compare to the rest of the country?

TIM ROSS: Well, New Brunswick is, you know, it could be a case study for what's happening coast to coast to coast. There's 14,000 units of affordable and social housing in New Brunswick, but across Canada, there's almost 600,000 units of social housing where federal operating subsidies are expiring. And without renewed investment, housing providers will have some difficult choices. They'll either be forced to raise rents, or defer maintenance, or liquidate housing assets. These are all options that are untenable, and they don't really jive with the mission of providing affordable housing.

AMT: So the operating subsidies that expire, what's that about?

TIM ROSS: So long term operating subsidies are set up for social housing providers coast to coast to coast in long term agreements. These operating subsidies are set to expire, and some have already expired. As of today in New Brunswick, 408 homes are no longer receiving federal subsidies, and another 268 homes will expire in 2016, this year. And without renewed investment, we’re forecasting that up to two-thirds of housing units will face viability challenges. Here's a little case study. We're working with our members to do viability testing at the end of operating subsidies, and we've got a member in Moncton, New Brunswick. They have a 13 unit building, and when there are subsidies end from the federal government, they're going to have an annual cash flow deficit in their first year of just $3,500. It doesn't sound like a lot, but what you're asking the housing provider to do is to either reduce costs somehow, which is simply not possible, or to increase their rents. So that would be a rent increase for each household of almost $300.

AMT: Okay, so let me ask you though, the view on many fronts is that unlike roads and bridges, social housing does not generate revenue after it's been built. How challenging is that for you when you're fighting for money?

TIM ROSS: I don't think it's about revenue generation, it's about protecting our neighbors who are vulnerable.

AMT: So how do you argue that, because you know the other side is going to argue the other side.

TIM ROSS: Well, we have a good example, with the At Home/Chez Soi Pilot Project that studied the efficacy of housing first, providing immediate housing and supports to individuals who have experienced homelessness. The result of providing housing to individuals who previously experience homelessness was a dramatic reduction in health and emergency service utilization. So it has allowed us to reduce different emergency costs associated with individuals experiencing homelessness, and it has provided a pathway to inclusion and community.

AMT: Okay, so now, you've been in conversations with specific government departments about this, what are they telling you?

TIM ROSS: Well, there's certainly, it's certainly identified as a priority. It was clearly articulated in the federal Liberal platform, but then it was expressed in black and white in the mandate letters. So to what we're hearing, it's not a matter of if we'll see in a significant increased investments in affordable and social housing, but it's how we're going to do it. And that's why we're looking forward to continuing those conversations with the federal government.

AMT: Okay, well, Tim Ross, thanks for bringing us up to date on what you're facing.

TIM ROSS: Thank you.

AMT: Tim Ross, executive director of the New Brunswick Non Profit Housing Association. He joined us from Ottawa. Well, social housing, and ice roads, to the many, many disparate demands for infrastructure spending from across the country. It's difficult to quantify just what the infrastructure deficit is in Canada. The figures range from 127 billion dollars to more than 500 billion dollars. Here's a clip of infrastructure Minister Amarjeet Sohi on how his department is evaluating proposals.

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AMARJEET SOHI: This is not just about building new, what will we do with the existing infrastructure, how do we repair what we have? How do we optimize and modernize the infrastructure that exists now? So, if we can do things more quickly in those areas, those are the things that we are going to be also looking at. I think, this is the message that I want to convey, that the federal government is here as a partner to work with provinces, municipalities, to meet their needs, and grow the economy, and create jobs.

AMT: Well as we did request an interview with the Minister of Infrastructure Amarjeet Sohi, he deferred the invitation until after the budget is released. So we'll be going after him to talk to us at that point. Matti Siemiatycki is an associate professor of geography and planning at the University of Toronto. His main area of research is infrastructure spending. This week, he's publishing a paper about cost overruns on infrastructure projects. He joins me in our Toronto studio, hello.

MATTI SIEMIATYCKI: Good morning.

AMT: Boy, you're studying the right thing for the times. [chuckles]

MATTI SIEMIATYCKI: Yeah, it's really timely right now.

AMT: So, the federal government has been inundated by infrastructure requests from mayors, special interest groups. What's the biggest challenge they face in deciding where to put the money?

MATTI SIEMIATYCKI: Picking the right projects. There is so much need right across this country. Billions and billions of dollars. There are estimates that we need 123 billion just to up keep and maintain what we have currently, and that says nothing of all the new infrastructure and proposals that you're hearing right across the country. So when you hear these proposals from all these different groups, the question is how do we pick between them, and make sure we're investing the right projects, the ones that are going to deliver all the benefits that infrastructure can provide, in terms of the economy, in terms of the environment, in terms of social equity and inclusion. Those are the benefits were looking for, but we really do have to find a way to pick between the different projects. Because there's so much need out there, and there's only so many dollars to go around.

AMT: And we just heard from our last guest, the operating costs are an issue in some of the subsidies being lost, and so you have to build that into the budget if you're going to hand money over to people already.

MATTI SIEMIATYCKI: And that's really a key part of this, is that a lot of the talk is about capital dollars, it's about getting projects built, it's about cutting ribbons, it's about being maintaining what we have, but you still have to maintain and operate these infrastructure and these assets once they're built, and where's that money going to come from over the long term? A lot of our infrastructure in the high priority areas, like housing or transit, don't cover their cost through user fees, and so you have to have other revenue sources, other mechanisms, to pay for that infrastructure, operation, and maintenance over the long run, or they're going to deteriorate.

AMT: [interposing] Like what? Tax?

MATTI SIEMIATYCKI: Like taxes, or higher user charges, or development charges. The money has to come from somewhere. If you want to invest in assets that don't cover their costs, you either have to raise user fees, or you have to cut expenditures elsewhere, or raise the money from other taxes.

AMT: And in the grand scheme of things, how significant is the figure 124 billion over 10 years?

MATTI SIEMIATYCKI: It's a big number, it's just about doubling the money that's already there. So that is a significant number. Keep in mind, the annual budget of the federal government is about 290 billion dollars, so you have to put that in perspective. We're about a two-trillion dollar economy for Canada, so you do have to put these numbers into perspective. But it is a big number, and it's holding us back, our infrastructure, we know, in terms of transportation and congestion, in terms of clean water, in terms of social and affordable housing. These are areas where we are being held back as a country, so that money can be very well spent and put to productive, good use.

AMT: Okay, now, we hear a lot about shovel-ready projects, and both the prime minister and his minister of infrastructure have been talking about approving public projects quickly. Is there a downside to favoring the shovel-ready project?

MATTI SIEMIATYCKI: There is a risk. The risk is that those are not necessarily the highest priority projects, and so those projects might not actually solve the problems that we have. They're the ones that are ready to go. We want to invest quickly, because there is an economic benefit. It gets people to work, we know we're entering into a recession. And so there is a way, investing in infrastructure does create jobs, but you want to have the long term benefits of infrastructure, which is really those productivity gains. The other problem is that the projects might actually not be ready on the planning scale, and so you can actually lead to cost overruns if you don't plan the projects very well upfront. That's a real risk with these big infrastructure projects. We know that they typically experience cost overruns, we know that the public is very frustrated and might lose confidence that we can actually deliver on these promises. So there is an impetus to move very quickly, but we also have to be cautious about what can be lost if we go too quickly and don't think through our priorities and getting the execution done well.

AMT: And before we get to overruns, let's talk about political gain. In the past, there's been criticism that parties in power use infrastructure spending for political gain.

MATTI SIEMIATYCKI: There's a long history of this, that infrastructure spending is highly visible, it gets politicians elected, and so the ribbon cuttings are very high profile. People love coming to them, getting the scissors out and cutting those ribbons is really an important part of retail politics. And so, there has been a history of investing more money in government ridings, or in part--

AMT: [interposing] Give us some examples.

MATTI SIEMIATYCKI: We would say the gazebos up in Muskoka, coming out of the G8, G20, where there was a federal minister who had a riding up there and a lot of money went--

AMT: [interposing] Tony Clement’s riding.

MATTI SIEMIATYCKI: Tony Clement. When federal money went in and around that riding to pay for infrastructure that was nominally about the G20, but also had a very high profile in that riding. That's just one example, and I don't want to pick on that one, but there are these examples all across the country, where you can see more money per capita going into these ridings that tend to be controlled by the government. We have to be careful of that, and shovel-ready can sometimes gloss over the good planning that will try to help us avoid that type of investment.

AMT: And now, we spoke to McGill University professor Saeed Mirza about what can be done to prevent governments from using infrastructure spending for political gain, listen to him.

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SAEED MIRZA: I’ve recommended in the past the creation of a national infrastructure bank for Canada. which would receive all its monies from the Federal Government, or other government sources. This bank would look at all of the infrastructure projects that need attention in Canada. And they would assess these based on several criteria that they would have to establish, and based on these criteria, they could issue loans to different groups. The projects must not be decided on by political considerations. I think that the Council of the infrastructure bank would basically look at each project in terms of its importance and significance, and then decide.

AMT: So Matti Siemiatycki, is that a good idea?

MATTI SIEMIATYCKI: Parts of it, I think, are really important. The parts about having a council that prioritizes projects that’s separate from government, I think that is a really important initiative that will separate the decision making from the politics. That could have a major impact across the country. The parts about the federal government loans, keep in mind, these will be loans to municipal governments, those governments already face very tight budgets. Even if the interest rates are somewhat lower, they still have to pay the money back. They might not have the capacity within their own budgets to pay that back. So, loans are an important topic, they might save some cost on borrowing, but the government still has to borrow that back, and if they don't have the tax revenues themselves, they’re going to have a hard time covering those expenses.

AMT: Let's talk about the money itself, some have raised concerns the government's about to spend too much on infrastructure. We have a clip here from Conservative infrastructure critic Dianne Watts, who is also the former mayor of Surrey, British Columbia.

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DIANNE: The biggest concern that I have, and certainly what I'm hearing, is the Liberal Government going into a deficit position. Because we handed over a balanced budget, and within that balanced budget, we had committed to the new Building Canada Plan. And that was a ten year plan, which was the largest and longest federal infrastructure plan in Canadian history. And so to go into a deficit position, and we know it's going to exceed 10 billion per year, is very concerning to all of us.

AMT: Is that a concern to you?

MATTI SIEMIATYCKI: I think the key is to see infrastructure as an investment, and if you're investing in the right projects, they will deliver both short term benefits in terms of jobs, but also long term benefits in terms of economic productivity gains. And that will drive our economy out of this recession. So, I think investing in infrastructure is really important. One thing to keep in mind is that the Conservative government actually also went into deficit after the 2008 recession, and so they took on 55 billion dollars in deficit spending in 2009. So there is a history of using deficit spending to invest in infrastructure.

AMT: Okay, and we're almost out of time, but overruns, cost overruns. Nice little phrase. How do you avoid them?

MATTI SIEMIATYCKI: Good planning upfront. Being very aware of the risks on your projects, doing your due diligence, keeping track of information, we have so little information on how these projects actually get done. And then, removing the politics from the decision-making.

AMT: Okay, well, let's see if we can hold them accountable on that one. Thank you very much for coming in.

MATTI SIEMIATYCKI: Thank you.

AMT: Matti Siemiatycki is an associate professor of geography and planning at the University of Toronto. He joined me in our studio. We want to hear from you, what kind of projects would you like to see funded with this infrastructure budget? Let us know how the project you recommend would benefit your community. Email us through our website, cbc.ca/thecurrent. We're on Facebook and on Twitter, @thecurrentCBC. That is our program for today. Stay with Radio One for q. Shad is speaking with John Wilson, founder of the most dreaded awards in film, the Golden Raspberries. Now, we talked earlier on this program about an attack this weekend by militants with al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb, on a hotel and Burkina Faso. 28 people were killed, including 6 Canadians, all of them from Quebec. Four of them were a family from Lac-Beauport, near Quebec City. The town will hold a vigil tonight to honor the victims, and we give the last word today to Louise Brunet, the mayor of the town. I'm Anna Maria Tremonti, thank you for listening to The Current.

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LOUISE BRUNET: They were a great family here in Lac-Beauport. They were very generous people, and they used to work for a humanitarian mission. So they were really, it’s a really great loss here in Lac-Beauport. They were, one of the kids, Charlelie, was working for a camp, daycare camp, for the community with other children, and he was really a great, appreciated from all the people around here. So, well, I can’t believe it. It’s a terrible act of terrorists, it's not acceptable. You know, it’s unbearable. And when you see that, and it's your neighbor, it's really a shock. Because we heard of that, it's in Europe or elsewhere, but when it's the people in your community here in Quebec, it's really difficult to accept. It’s really sad.

[Music: Sting]

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January 18, 2016 Episode Transcript

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